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I. INTRODUCTION

Most people do not associate agriculture with international strife
and controversy. On the contrary, our picture of agricultural production is the idyllic family farm located in some picturesque rural area
free from wider-world pressures. Regrettably, such is not the case.
Agriculture, today, is the center of a set of multi-dimensional international controversies and crises. International agricultural strife
threatens the future of the global free-trade system, and it has soured
relations between the United States and its principal allies and trading
partners: Canada, the European Community (EC), and Japan.' The
agricultural trade controversy is at the heart of the bitter stalemate of
the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) negotiations.2 The deadlock over farm trade has called into
* B.A., St. Joseph's College; J.D., University of Michigan Law School. Rusk Professor
and Executive Director of Dean Rusk Center for International and Comparative Law, University of Georgia.
1. See Stuart Auerbach, GA TT Chief in Talks Here on EC Crisis,Dunkel Pact Crucial to
World Economies, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 1992, at A13 (noting agreement needed to avoid
trade war).
2. William Drozdiak, US., Europe Meet on Disputes Blocking Trade Pact, WASH. POST,
Oct. 12, 1992, at A30.
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question the very future of the GATT as an international organization.3 Controversies over agriculture also endanger approval of the
recently concluded North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA).4
How did all this come about? The current crisis concerning international trade is rooted in the 1970s, which was a time of rapidly
expanding growth. Global agricultural trade increased from $50 billion per year in 1970 to more than $225 billion a decade later.' World
areas that had formerly been relatively self-sufficient fueled this rapid
growth. Because of adverse weather and population growth, developing countries increased their agricultural imports. The Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe became large importers of foodstuffs. Economic
growth in countries such as Japan also resulted in higher demand for
agricultural products.
Unfortunately, the boom of the 1970s was followed by the bust of
the 1980s. Between 1980 and 1985, farm trade decreased by about
11%. The impact on the United States was even more severe.6
United States farm exports fell from a record level of $43.3 billion in
1981 to $26.1 billion in 1986. 7 The farm exports of the EC, the
United States' major export-market competitor, also declined during
this period, decreasing from $29.1 billion in 1981 to $26.1 billion in
1986.8 Thus, the United States, once the world's largest exporter of
agricultural products, ran second to the EC.9
Since 1986, the world market for agricultural products has recov3. See id. (reporting that South American agricultural exporting countries walked out of
trade meeting after EC, Japan, and South Korea refused to negotiate trade dispute).
4. Peter Behr, Kantor Questions Key Facets of International Trade Pact, Comments Cast
Doubt on the Future of GATT, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1993, at GI (quoting Trade Representa-

tive Kantor that GATT agreement may be unfair and that GATT organization may not be
viable).
5. ECONOMic RES. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOREIGN AGRIC. ECONOMIC REP.
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN AGRICULTURE: MEASUREMENT, EVALUATION,
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 3 (1987); Jon G. Filipek, Agriculture in a

No. 229,

World of ComparativeAdvantage: The Prospectsfor Farm Trade Liberalization in the Uruguay
Round of GATT Negotiations, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 123, 124 (1989).

6.

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE GATT NEGOTIATIONS AND U.S. TRADE

POLICY 72 (1987).

7. Id. at 74.
8. Jon G. Filipek, Agriculture in a World of Comparative Advantage. The Prospectsfor
Farm Trade Liberalization in the Uruguay Round of GA TT Negotiations, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J.
123, 125 (1989).

9. See id. (noting that EC and United States both exported $26.1 billion worth of farm
products).
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ered partially, while the United States, the EC, and other agricultural
exporting nations have attempted to exploit export markets. With the
aid of a weaker United States dollar, lower price supports, and agricultural subsidies, the United States has boosted its exports to $42.4
billion this fiscal year. l' However, the United States and the EC are
now aggressively competing to increase their respective shares of export markets. This competition, along with escalating budgetary
costs, unpredictable world agricultural markets fluctuations, and severe trade friction, has produced the current agricultural crisis.
II.

AGRICULTURE AND THE

GATT

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), with 108
contracting parties, is not only an international organization, but is
also the major source of international trade law. Although the GATT
has enjoyed great success in securing multilateral custom-tariff reductions on manufactured trade and has progressed in eliminating nontariff trade barriers, the GATT has been less successful in liberalizing
agricultural trade. I' GATT provisions exempt agricultural trade
from several of the organization's customary trade regulations.' 2 Because of political considerations, the major agriculture-producing
countries have been unwilling or unable to apply the strict regulations
controlling trade in manufactured products to agricultural products.
First, the GATT exempts agricultural products from the Article
XI ban of all "prohibitions and restrictions" on the importation or
exportation of products. 13 Consequently, the GATT does not bar
quotas on agricultural products. Under GATT Article XI:2(c), countries may establish quantitative import restrictions on agricultural
products to protect domestic farm programs. 4 However, the Article
10.

ECONOMIC RES. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL TRADE OF

1 (Nov./Dec. 1992).
11. Jon G. Filipek, Agriculture in a World of ComparativeAdvantage: The Prospectsfor

THE UNITED STATES

Farm Trade Liberalization in the Uruguay Round of GA TT Negotiations, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J.

123, 123-26 (1989) (listing inadequacies of GATT).
12. See id. at 136 (noting GATT exceptions created for agricultural trade).
13. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT], openedfor signature Oct. 30, 1947,
art. XI, 61 Stat. Part 5, AS l, T.I.A.S. 1700, reprintedin International Trade Agreements, INT'L

TRADE REP. (BNA) 75:0807 (Reference File 1987). This Article states that "[no prohibitions
or restriction other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through quotas,
import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained .. . on the
importation ... or on the exportation ... of any product." Id.
14. Id. art XI, § 2(c). This provision permits "[i]mport restrictions on any agricultural or
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XI exemption restricts the level of domestic production to approximately the same level as imports.' 5
In 1951, a GATT working group found that the United States was
guilty of violating Article XI by imposing restrictions on dairy-product imports without also restricting domestic production.' 6 The
United States Congress, however, thumbed its collective nose at the
GATT. Congress passed an amendment to Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, which required the executive branch to restrict
agricultural imports interfering with domestic farm-programs operation, notwithstanding any "trade agreement or other international
agreement . . . entered into by the United States.""' The United
States then asked for and received a GATT waiver in 1955.18 This

waiver, which remains in effect today, allowed the United States to
disregard the GATT rules with respect to agricultural quotas.' 9
The GATT waiver has profoundly impacted agricultural trade.
The United States has used the waiver at various times to restrict imports of many agricultural products-such as dairy, beef, and sugarbut then has not imposed important domestic reduction restraints.2 °
Because of the GATT waiver, the United States has been in a poor
negotiating position when arguing that other member nations should
strictly comply with GATT agricultural trade rules. In addition, the
waiver has been cited as a reason why other countries feel compelled
to stretch or break the GATT rules.21
fisheries product... necessary to the enforcement of government measures which operate...
(1) to restrict the quantities of like domestic product . . . or . . . (2) to remove temporary
surplus .... " Id.
15. Id.
16. See JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF THE GATT § 27.6, at 733
(The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 1969) (noting Netherlands' complaint that United States violated
Article XI).
17. Act of June 16, 1951, ch. 141, § 8(b), 65 Stat. 72, 75 (amending § 22 of Agricultural
Adjustment Act). The amendment provided that "[n]o trade agreement or other international
agreement heretofore or hereafter entered into by the United States shall be applied in a manner inconsistent with the requirements of this section." Id.
18. Jon G. Filipek, Agriculture in a World of ComparativeAdvantage: The Prospectsfor
Farm Trade Liberalizationin the Uruguay Round of GA TT Negotiations, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J.
123, 137 (1989).
19. JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF THE GATT § 27.6, at 735
(The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 1969).
20. See Jon G. Filipek, Agriculture in a World of ComparativeAdvantage: The Prospects
for Farm Trade Liberalization in the Uruguay Round of GA TT Negotiations, 30 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 123, 164 (1989) (stating that dairy, peanuts, and sugar products are heavily protected).
21. Id. at 138.
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Besides agricultural exemptions, the GATT also contains special
liberal treatment for agricultural subsidies. Article XVI of the
GATT, which prohibits both direct and indirect export subsidies that

can distort trade, contains an exception for agriculture and other "pri-

mary products."22 This GATT agricultural export-subsidies exception contains merely a vague restriction on subsidies to prevent
countries from using primary products to capture more than an "equitable share of world export trade."2 3 What constitutes a more-thanequitable share of world export trade is left undefined, although Article XVI notes that parties should account for "previous representative
periods" and "special factors" affecting trade in a particular

product.24
During the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations, which ended in
1979, the member nations concluded a new Subsidies Code that tightened the permissive language in Article XVI. However, the new Code
has had only a marginal effect. The Subsidies Code continues to permit agricultural export subsidies, provided that the subsidizer obtains
less than an equitable share of world trade. 25 The Code signatories
agree to refrain from instituting export subsidies on primary products
22. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT], openedfor signature Oct. 30, 1947,
art. XVI, 61 Stat. Part 5, A51, T.I.A.S. 1700, reprinted in International Trade Agreements,
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 75:0810 (Reference File 1987). Article XVI provides in part:
2. The contracting parties recognize that the granting by a contracting party of a subsidy on the export of any product may have harmful effects for other contracting parties,
both importing and exporting, may cause undue disturbance to their normal commercial
interest, and may hinder the achievement of the objectives of this Agreement.
3. Accordingly, contracting parties should seek to avoid the use of subsidies on the export of primary products. If, however, a contracting party grants directly or indirectly
any form of subsidy which operates to increase the export of any primary product from its
territory, such subsidy shall not be applied in any manner which results in that contracting party having more than an equitable share of world export trade in that product,
account being taken of the shares of the contracting parties in such trade in the product
during a previous representative period....
4. Further, as from I January 1958 or the earliest practicable date thereafter, contracting parties shall cease to grant either directly or indirectly any form of subsidy on the
export of any product other than a primary product which subsidy results in the sale of
such product for export at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the product to buyers in the domestic market.
Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, reprinted in LAW AND PRACTICE
UNDER THE GATT II.C.l (Kenneth R. Simmonds & Brian N.W. Hill eds., 1988).
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that lower prices below that of other suppliers, or that injure domestic
industries or displace products of other signatories located either in
26
the subsidized or third country.
The Subsidies Code also contains an elaborate dispute-settlement
mechanism. 27 Agricultural-products disputes have proven difficult to
resolve. The first meaningful test of the new Subsidies Code, the case
of EC Wheatflour Export Subsidies, yielded only an inconclusive and
ambiguous GATT decision. 28 The GATT Panel concluded that EC
wheat subsidies had indeed caused "undue disturbance to normal
United States commercial interest."' 29 The trade experts acknowledged that export subsidization had greatly increased the EC's share
of the world markets.30 Nevertheless, the Panel refused to find that
the EC undercut prices or used its subsidies to gain more than an
equitable share of the world market.31 The Panel reached these contradictory conclusions because it could not agree on an appropriate
base period for defining the EC's equitable share. Because the United
States failed to secure relief at the GATT, the United States took retaliatory measures and instituted a wheat-flour export-subsidy program of its own.
In the EC Pasta Export Case, a GATT Panel concluded that subsidized pasta exports violated GATT rules; however, the EC blocked
the Panel decision by arguing that the GATT should permit export
subsidies to offset the high cost of durum wheat.32 Again, the United
States retaliated and imposed a unilateral tariff increase on imported
pasta, which caused the EC to raise duties on fresh lemons, walnuts,
and citrus fruits. The matter was resolved through bilateral negotiations in 1986: the parties agreed to acceptable pasta-subsidy levels
26. Id.
27. Jon G. Filipek, Agriculture in a World of ComparativeAdvantage: The Prospectsfor
Farm Trade Liberalization in the Uruguay Round of GA TT Negotiations, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J.
123, 145 (1989).
28. GATT Dispute Panel Report on U.S. Complaint Concerning EC Subsidies to Wheat
Farmers, 18 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 899 (1983) (concluding that EC's share of world
export market for wheat flour increased but not finding share inequitable). The Panel Report

in this case is not official because it was never adopted by the Subsidies Code Committee.
29. Id.
30. Id.

31. Id.
32. GATT Pasta Panel Report on US. Section 301 Complaint Against European Community Subsidies, 8 U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 468, 469 (1983). This Panel Report was also
never adopted.
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and a truce in the citrus-products war. 33 The United States and EC
also agreed not to pursue the issue of GATT legality of the pastasubsidy levels.34 Obviously, the resolution of this dispute was only a
temporary truce, not a meaningful agreement.
The EC has not been the United States' only agricultural nemesis in
the GATT. The United States also objected to Japan's import quotas
on twelve different agricultural items. In the JapaneseImport Quota
Case, a GATT Panel concluded that ten of Japan's twelve import
quotas were contrary to Article XI.3 5 The import quotas concerned a
variety of products: (1) prepared and preserved milk and cream; (2)
processed cheese; (3) lactose; (4) dairy-food preparations; (5) dried,
leguminous vegetables; (6) starch; (7) glucose; (8) brown nuts; (9) prepared and preserved bee honey; (10) fruit juices, pur6e, and paste; (11)
prepared and preserved pineapples; and (12) tomato juice, tomato
sauce, and catsup. a6 Japan accepted the Panel's decision and agreed
to liberalize eight of the items by 1990.37 Although Japan did not
completely liberalize starch, it did agree to reduce progressively the
tariff quota on corn; it also agreed to enlarge import quotas for prepared and preserved dairy products.38 The GATT Panel upheld Japan's quotas on leguminous vegetables and ground nuts because
Japan had implemented measures to reduce domestic production in
accordance with Article XI: l(c).3 9 Although these two products
were exempt from GATT restrictions, Japan agreed to open its market progressively to imports of these products as well.
One of the most bitter and protracted agricultural trade disputes is
33. Id. at 468.
34. Id.
35. Japan-Restrictionson Imports of Certain Agricultural Products (US. v. Japan), reprinted in HANDBOOK OF GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT at 391-419 (Pierre Pescatore et al.
eds., 1988).
36. Id. at 391-419.
37. See Paul Blustein, Instead of a "Managed" Trade Policy, Why Not Just Cut the
Budget Deficit?, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 1989, at B3 (noting that Japan had quotas to protect its
agricultural products); Margaret Shapiro, US., Japan Reach Accord on Imports; Quotas, Tariffs Eased on Beef and Citrus, WASH. POST, June 20, 1988, at AI (reporting that Japan agreed
to ease some trade limitations).
38. See Ronald E. Yates, JapaneseRally Around the Farm; US. Attack on Quotas Stirs a
Storm, CHIC. TRIB., Jan. 17, 1988 at C2 (stating that GATT Panel decision required Japan to
ease trade restrictions on 10 agricultural products).
39. Japan-Restrictionson Imports of Certain Agricultural Products (US. v. Japan), reprinted in HANDBOOK OF GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT at 418 (Pierre Pescatore et al. eds.,
1988).
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the current oilseeds controversy between the United States and the
EC. In December 1987, the American Soybean Association filed a
Section 301 petition with the United States Trade Representative
(USTR), claiming that EC oilseed subsidies to oilseed processors nullified and impaired rights of the United States under the GATT because the subsidies undercut the EC's 1962 zero-duty bindings on
oilseeds.' A GATT Panel agreed, and in December 1989 and January 1990, the EC Council of Ministers adopted a new oilseed-subsidy
plan that involved payments to producers on a per hectare basis. 4
The United States attacked this subsidy as well, and, in October 1991,
the United States Senate voted 97-0 to urge the USTR to file a second
Section 301 action.42 In March 1992, a second GATT Panel ruled
that the new oilseed subsidies nullified and impaired the rights of the
United States under the GATT.43 When the EC refused to accept this
decision, the United States sought compensation under Article
XXVIII and threatened to impose punitive tariffs on $1 billion of EC
agricultural products, including wines, cheeses, and beers. In response, the EC offered the United States only $400 million in compensation. This dispute complicated the agricultural trade-revision
negotiations at the GATT Uruguay Round.
Fortunately, the United States and the EC were able to settle this
dispute and avoid a destructive "tit-for-tat" trade war. On November
40. EEC-Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins (U.S. v. EC), reprinted in HANDBOOK OF GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT at 525 (Pierre Pescatore et al, eds., 1990). The Panel also found that the producer
subsidies violated the national treatment obligation of the GATT, Article 111:4.
41. See European Community: Settlement of Oilseed Dispute Continues To Elude EC and
U.S., 8 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1588 (Current Rep. 1991) (describing per hectare compensation scheme); European Community: Head of EC Farm Ministers Council Offers Compromise Agreement on Oilseeds Subsidies, 8 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1536 (Oct. 23, 1991)
(reporting that new program pays oilseed producers per hectare of cultivated land rather than
by production level).
42. See European Community: U.S. Informs GATT It Intends To Raise Tariffs on $1
Billion in EC Imports, 9 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 785 (Current Rep. 1992) (acknowledging
that in October 1991, United States asked GATT Panel to reconvene to reconsider ECUnited States agricultural controversy).
43. European Community: EC Foreign Ministers Urge Commission To Continue Farm
Trade Talks with U.S., 9 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1916 (Current Rep. 1992); GATT: Panel
Reports EC Oilseed Policy on Subsidies Inconsistent with GATT, 9 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA)
533 (Current Rep. 1992). The EC defended the oilseed subsidy to producers on the basis of
Article III:8(a) of the GATT, which permits payment of subsidies to domestic producers.

However, the GATT Panel ruled that the oilseed subsidies still nullified and impaired United
States rights under the GATT.
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21, 1992, United States and EC negotiators announced an accord on
oilseeds and the Uruguay Round as follows:
(1) The EC agreed to reduce its subsidized oilseed production. If the
EC oilseeds exceeds 5.128 million hectares of land, EC oilseeds producers will receive smaller subsidy payments on all oilseed production.
(2) The EC and the United States agreed to support a GATT Uruguay
Round agreement that will require a 20% reduction from a 1986-1988
base in the average level of internal farm-price supports.
(3) The EC and the United States agreed to support a GATT Uruguay
Round agreement that reduces by 21% the volume of subsidized farm
exports (reducing subsidy outlays by 36%) based on the 1986-1988 reference period."
This agreement is important in that it settles a nasty outstanding
dispute and accepts, in principle, the idea of reductions in both subsidized oilseed production and farm-export subsidies. However, the
Oilseeds Agreement is not a fundamental breakthrough. Subsidized
oilseed production in the EC will continue, but will fall to between 8.5
and 9.7 million metric tons per year (down from current levels of
about 13 million metric tons).4 5 Agricultural export subsidies will
also continue, although at reduced levels.
III.

THE HISTORY OF GATT NEGOTIATIONS ON AGRICULTURE

Agricultural trade has been an important subject of negotiations in
the GATT rounds since the 1960s. The so-called Dillon Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 1961-62, focused on the EC's common external tariff and the EC's primary import-protection tool for
agricultural products-the variable levy.4 6 At the Dillon Round, the
United States used its bargaining power to obtain substantial trade
concessions from the EC, including zero-tariff bindings for certain agricultural products, such as oilseed and corn gluten.4 7 These low tariff
bindings, which the EC now wants to withdraw, are at the heart of
many current agricultural trade disputes.
44. USDA Statement on US.-EC Accord on Oilseeds and the Uruguay Round, 9
TRADE REP.

INT'L

(BNA) 2028 (Current Rep. 1992).

45. GA TT U.S., EC Announce Breakthrough in GATT Trade Talks, Oilseed Dispute, 9
INT'L TRADE REP.

(BNA) 1990 (Current Rep. 1992).

46. See Jon G. Filipek, Agriculture in a World of ComparativeAdvantage: The Prospects
for Farm Trade Liberalizationin the Uruguay Round of GA TT Negotiations, 30 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 123, 139-40 (1989).

47. See id. at 141 (noting modest reductions in agricultural tariffs).
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Several other agricultural trade disputes flared in the 1960s. In the
so-called Kennedy Round of Trade Negotiations, 1964-67, agricultural tariffs remained high compared to manufactured goods, and fundamental problems such as the EC's variable levy remained
unaddressed. 8 Throughout the decade, the United States and the EC
battled each other in the so-called "chicken war," which involved a
German effort to limit United States exports of frozen chickens to
West Germany. 49 The dispute was unsatisfactorily resolved when a
GATT dispute-resolution Panel ruled in favor of the United States,
allowing the United States to withdraw equal-trade concessions.5°
The chicken war, however, served to confirm the intractable nature of
agricultural trade disputes.
The agricultural trade war continued in the 1970s. During the Tokyo Round of Trade Negotiations, 1974-79, agricultural trade was a
separate negotiating topic. Despite this procedural difference, the Tokyo Round failed to make progress in liberalizing agricultural trade.
In 1979, the GATT parties concluded international consultative
agreements for dairy products and beef, established codes of conduct
relating to standards and technical trade barriers, and delineated the
use of subsidies.5" These agreements, however, constituted only marginal improvement.
By the opening of the Uruguay Round, agriculture moved to the
top of the negotiating agenda. Because of the crisis in global agricultural trade, declining farm incomes, and lower employment levels in
major trading countries, agricultural trade became an even more important GATT issue. In contrast to previous Rounds, agriculture was
the linchpin of the Uruguay Round negotiating process. Without a
broad agreement on agricultural trade reform, there could never be a
successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round. From the beginning of
the negotiation, the main protagonists were the United States and the
EC. Other countries, such as Japan, the Cairns Group, and nations
with significant agricultural export interests-such as Argentina,
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Thailand, and Uruguay-offered
48. See id. at 142 (stating that Kennedy Round resulted in resolution of only two issues).
49. JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF THE GATT § 8.4, at 174-75
(The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 1969).
50. Id. § 8.4, at 175.
51. Jon G. Filipek, Agriculture in a World of ComparativeAdvantage.: The Prospectsfor
Farm Trade Liberalization in the Uruguay Round of GA TT Negotiations, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J.
123, 143 (1989).
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proposals, but they were generally unable fundamentally to influence
the negotiation. The EC and the United States have been required
ultimately to compromise their differences to create an opportunity to
achieve a Uruguay Round Agreement.
The opening United States negotiating proposal was ambitious.
The United States called for a complete phase-out of all agricultural
subsidies that directly or indirectly affect trade.5 2 Over a ten-year period, the proposal would eliminate not only export subsidies, but also
subsidized-crop insurance and research.53 Only policies that are at
least theoretically trade neutral could be permitted: direct income
support for farmers and bona fide foreign and domestic aid programs.5 4 The United States proposal called for the elimination of all
barriers to imports, such as import quotas, variable levies, minimum
import prices, tariffs, and state-trading activities over a ten-year period. The United States also urged for the harmonization of standards affecting agricultural trade.55
The EC viewed this United States free-trade proposal as "extreme
and unacceptable." 56 The EC suggested instead a 30% reduction in
subsidies over 10 years, using 1986 as the base year.5" The EC called
for a system of "rebalancing" subsidies and other measures among

52. Id. at 148.
53. Id. at 149.
54. Id.
55. See Jon G. Filipek, Agriculture in a World of ComparativeAdvantage: The Prospects
for Farm Trade Liberalization in the Uruguay Round of GA TT Negotiations, 30 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 123, 149 (1989).
56. Lyn MacNabb & Robert Weaver, Comment, The GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GA 7T): Has Agriculture Doomed the Uruguay Round?, 26 LAND & WATER L. REV.
761, 776 (1991) (noting that "the [EC] was not prepared for an across-the-board reduction of
agricultural import barriers as suggested by the United States."); see also Sylvia Ostry, Europe
1992 and the Evolution of the Multilateral Trade System, 22 CASE. W. RES. J. INT'L L. 311,
312 (1990) (noting EC rejection of United States proposal); Loretta F. Smith, Comment, The
GA TT and InternationalTrade, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 919, 961 & n.189 (1991) (discussing United
States proposal); European Community Farm Ministers Back MacSharry on Subsidy Cuts at
Talks, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA), Sept. 27, 1990 (noting United States' unacceptable
proposal).
57. See Loretta F. Smith, Comment, The GATT and International Trade, 39 BUFF. L.
REV. 919, 963 & n.201 (1991). Smith noted that "the EC wanted to accomplish farm trade
liberalization by a lumping or a global approach in which all kinds of farm support for a
product would be lumped into an aggregate measure of support that would then be reduced by
30% by 1995." Id.; see Lyn MacNabb & Robert Weaver, Comment, The GeneralAgreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GA TT): Has Agriculture Doomed the Uruguay Round?, 26 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 761, 779 (noting EC proposal having 30% reduction of trade barriers over 10
years, using 1986 as base year).
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individual commodities, while maintaining the same aggregate level of

support. This would ensure that concessions made by converting subsidies into tariffs would be countered by higher tariffs on other products.5" The EC's proposal appeared essentially defensive, and aimed
at maintaining the status quo.5 9
After the agricultural trade negotiations floundered and the Uruguay Round stalled in 1990, the GATT Director General, Arthur
Dunkel, attempted to jump-start the Uruguay Round negotiation by

introducing a new compromise proposal and draft agreement known

as the Dunkel Draft. 6° Dunkel proposed that the GATT nations
decouple income support for farmers from trade. 6' In other words,

58. See Lyn MacNabb & Robert Weaver, Comment, The GeneralAgreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GA TT): Has Agriculture Doomed the Uruguay Round?, 26 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 761, 775 (1991) (explaining that variable levies act like adjustable tariff keeping prices
high for farmers); see also Sylvia Ostry, Europe 1992 and the Evolution of the Multilateral
Trading System, 22 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 311, 319 (1990) (stating that "rebalancing" of
barriers diluted any previous concessions by United States); Agriculture: EC Uruguay Round
Proposal Would Leave CAP Essentially Unchanged, Back Tariffication, 6 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) 1617 (Current Rep. 1989) (noting that rebalancing would lower certain products' high
tariffs and raise or implement new tariffs for products low tariffs); Loretta F. Smith, Comment,
The GATT and International Trade, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 919, 963-64 (1991) (discussing
rebalancing concept to reduce variable levy).
59. See Loretta F. Smith, Comment, The GAIT and InternationalTrade, 39 BUFF. L.
REV. 919, 963-64 (1991) (noting that EC proposal maintains status quo).
60. See William D. Hunter, Key Provisionsof the "Dunkel Draft" on Antidumping and
Subsidies and CountervailingDuties, in THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS 1992: DEVELOPMENTS IN IMPORT ADMINISTRATION; EXPORT AND INVESTMENT ABROAD at 13 (PLI
Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 789, 1992) (noting that "[i]n an attempt to
break the negotiating log jam in the Uruguay Round negotiations on December 20, 1991,
GATT Director-General Arthur Dunkel issued a draft agreement on most of the topics covered by the Round ...

referred to as the 'Dunkel text' or the 'Dunkel Draft' "); Kenneth W.

Abbott, The Uruguay Round and Dispute Resolution: Building a Private Interests System of
Justice, 1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 111, 112 n.5 (stating that Dunkel Draft "designed to
stimulate an overall conclusion to the Round"); Robert Housman & Durwood Zaelke, Trade,
Environment and Sustainable Development: A Primer, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
535, 558-59 (1992) (discussing Uruguay Round's progress toward agreement in "Dunkel
Draft").
61. See GA TT EC Trade, Agriculture Ministers Oppose Dunkel Text, Instructing GA TT
Negotiations, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA), Jan. 14, 1992 (noting that Dunkel Draft called for
cutting link between trade and income supports); News Highlights. GA TTEC Ministers Reiterate Opposition to Farm Proposalsin Dunkel Draft, 9 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 100 (Current
Rep. 1992) (discussing EC criticism of Dunkel's ideas). This article recognized the EC argument against Dunkel that "the new form of compensation for farmers purposed in its CAP
reform plan would cut the link between the volume of production and the level of subsidy."
Id. It additionally noted that the Dunkel document distorts trade through income supports.
Id.
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income support would not be linked to the volumes of production,
factors of production, or domestic or international prices of commodities. Instead, income support would be based upon other factors decided upon by each particular nation. The Dunkel Draft also
proposed a 36% cut in export subsidies, and a 24% cut in the volume
of subsidized exports 62 and non-tariff barriers to agricultural trade,
such as quotas, variable levies, licensing systems, and minimum import prices.
Under the Dunkel Draft, voluntary export restrictions would be
replaced by tariff levels equal to the difference between the domestic
and international price of the product in question. 63 This "tariffication" of agricultural trade restrictions would be universal, although
there would be two special safeguards: a quantity-trigger safeguard,
and a price-trigger safeguard. The quantity-trigger safeguard could
be invoked in a year when the quantity of imports of an item exceeds
125% of the average imports over the last 3-year period. 6' Under this
circumstance, the tariff could be raised by 30%. The price-trigger
safeguard would operate when the import price of an item declined
below the trigger price-the average import price for the period between 1986 and 1988.65 Under these circumstances, a contracting
party could impose a tariff equal to 30% of the difference between the
import price and the trigger price when the differences ranged between 10 and 40%; the tariff could be 50% when the differences

62. GA T. Negotiations Have Lasted Six Long Years, REUTER

LIB. REP.,

Nov. 20, 1992,

available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File; see GATT.- USDA Preparing $1 Billion
Increase in Export Subsidies If GA TT Talks Fail, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA), Apr. 2, 1992
(discussing Dunkel's effect on farm export subsidies).
63. See A.E. Cullison, Japan Rejects Dunkel Pushfor Tariff on Rice, in THE NEW YORK
TIMES Co.: ABSTRACTS, Sept. 2, 1992, at A12 (finding Dunkel's tariffication alternative
favorable); Japan Must Deliver Once U.S., EC Settle Row, Dunkel Says, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, Nov. 18, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File (noting Dunkel
urged Japan and other nations with import barriers on some farm products into tariffs);
Keidanren Head Supports Dunkel Proposalon GATT Talks, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, Sept.
1, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File (Dunkel "call[s] for countries to
adopt tariffication, which supports converting nontariff barriers on imported farm products
into tariffs that are gradually reduced").
64. Highlights of Dunkel's FinalDraft Trade Accord, JAPAN EON. NEWSWIRE, Dec. 21,
1991, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File. Any participant is allowed to take
advantage of special safeguards if "the volume of imports exceeds a trigger level equal to 125%
of the corresponding average quantity during the past 3 years or 125% of the minimum access
opportunity and if the import price, including cost of insurance and freight, falls below a
trigger price equal to the average 1986 to 1988 reference price." Id.
65. Id.
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ranged between 40 and 60%; 70% when the difference ranged between 60 and 75%; and 90% when the range rose above 75%.66
Whether the Dunkel Draft is a viable compromise remains to be
seen. Even if a compromise is fashioned along the lines of the Dunkel
Draft and the Uruguay Round is successful, the farm-trade controversy will not end. The international trade of agricultural products
has created a unique political and economic structure. Unlike many
other areas of international trade, there is a direct link between the
crisis in international trade of agricultural products and the domestic
policies followed by the major participating countries. Any effort to
reform the rules of international agricultural trade is doomed unless
the nations address the underlying causes of trade controversies and
reform their domestic policies on agricultural production. In short, it
is not enough to fix farm trade at the GATT; the major developed
countries, such as the United States, the EC, and Japan, must make a
parallel effort to reform domestic agricultural policies.
The link between international agricultural trade and domestic foreign policies is important because in virtually all other economic sectors there is the same degree of government intervention and control.
Nations with free-market economies have two objectives when they
intervene deeply in agriculture: (1) to protect traditional farm structures and farmers' standard of living and way of life; and (2) to maintain self-sufficiency in food production.
Countries generally justify the first objective by contending they are
preserving jobs, but actually more is involved. Agriculture is a unique
industry. Because of weather and other factors, commodity prices
can vary widely; consequently, farm income can vary sharply. Market forces are typically hard on individual farmers. Farmers cannot
compensate for decreasing commodity prices by cutting expenses because their major expenses-land and equipment-have relatively stable prices. Thus, the individual farmer must have a cushion or a
safety net to prevent economic hardship. Governments in developed
countries are responsive to such concerns and have been willing to
intervene and stabilize farm prices and income at a relatively high
level. Moreover, most governments, even in this age of global interdependence, hesitate to abandon the ideal of self-sufficient food
production.
66. See id. (discussing tariffs imposed by contracting party under Dunkel Draft).
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Paradoxically, as nations improve their economies and increase
their gross domestic products, governments have more and more difficulty maintaining high farm prices and income levels. The reason for
this anomaly is that as consumer incomes rise, demand for food does
not increase significantly. Consequently, consumers spend progressively less, in percentage terms, of their income on food. Yet, because
of technological and scientific progress in farming techniques, more
and more food is produced with less labor. As a result, government
spending for agricultural programs climbs precipitously. Government programs, in turn, encourage overproduction of foodstuffs, and
the surplus must be disposed of in some way-usually by selling it on
world markets.67
IV.

NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL POLICIES

The three major players at the Uruguay Round, the United States,
the EC, and Japan, have major programs to maintain farm income
and employment. Inevitably, these domestic farm programs require
governments to establish policies that affect international trade. To
avoid disrupting domestic programs, governments feel compelled to
protect domestic markets from international competition and to ensure that agricultural surpluses are sold. Consequently, developed
countries employ typically three types of agricultural policies: internal price supports; border restrictions, like tariffs, quotas, and restrictive-licensing measures; and export subsidies.
A.

Japan

Although Japan has progressively liberalized its restrictions on
many agricultural products,6 8 including citrus fruits, beef, and other
67. See Jonathan Rauch, What If Congress Won't Act?, NAT'L J., Mar. 23, 1985, at 637
(discussing improvement in agriculture market if there were no governmental programs); US.
Calls for Reduction of AgriculturalSubsidies, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Apr. 10, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File. The reporter noted that "[a]nalysts say that
U.S. has a better chance to regain its dominant position in farm trade if all the countries
eliminate their agricultural subsidies." Id. Furthermore, analysts say that the world farm
sector is far from healthy, because overproduction has lowered food prices 38% since 1980.
Id.
68. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Trade Friction with Japan and the American Policy Response, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1647, 1647 (1984) (finding Japan has "expand[ed] significantly the
quotas on beef and agricultural products" and citing Japan, US. Reach Trade Compromise,
THE JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 26, 1984, at 1 (int'l ed.)); see also Fusae Nara, Note, A Shift Toward
Protectionism Under301 of the 1974 Trade Act: Problems of Unilateral Trade Relation Under
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commodities, Japan still maintains import quotas on a variety of commodities, including rice, wheat, barley, milk and dairy products, pig
meat, poultry, and tropical products. 69 The rice quota is Japan's most
important agricultural import barrier. Under current law, not one
grain of rice may be imported legally into Japan.7 Recently, Japanese officials sought to ban even the import of sushi from the United
States on the grounds that it contains rice, 7 although Japanese imInternationalLaw, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV.229, 240 (1990) (stating Japan liberalized restrictions
on these products in response to United States retaliation to such restrictions); K. Blake
Thatcher, Comment, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Its Utility Against Alleged Unfair
Trade Practices by the Japanese Government, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 492, 524 (1987) (contending
that "threat[s] of both Section 301 and GATT filings helped induce Japan to accept increased
quotas on beef and citrus imports); JapanAgrees To Buy More US. Beef Citrus; US., Industry
Drop Plans To File Complaints, 27 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 838 (Current Rep. 1984) (discussing Japan's increased quotas).
69. K. Blake Thatcher, Comment, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Its Utility
Against Alleged Unfair Trade Practices by the Japanese Government, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 492,
524 (1987) (discussing Japan's restrictive practices regarding rice and other goods); Bilateral
Talks on Japan's GATT-12 Compliance Continue, GATT Council Meeting a Benchmark, 5
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 975 (Current Rep. 1988) (stating that Japan refuses to liberalize
protection on powdered and concentrated milk and other products, maintaining it would mean
disaster for domestic products of these commodities).
70. See International Trade: Japan Will Have To Make 'PoliticalDecision' on Rice Imports, Officials Say, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Dec. 3, 1992, § 233, at DII (noting that
Japan "will have to make a decision about the Uruguay Round multilateral trade talks [and]
until then, Japan's total ban on rice imports will remain in force" and citing Japan as No. 1
Myth, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 1986, at 30, col. 1). The Daily Report for Executives stated:
Rice farmers are a powerful political lobby in Japan. The Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP), the ruling political party in Japan since 1955, obtains much of its support from
farmers and other rural voters, and any attempt to liberalize restrictions on rice would
prompt mass demonstrations at the Diet and disastrous results at the polls for the LDP.
Id. The Japanese government recently faced just such a situation when it purposed to cut rice
subsidies by a mere 38%. The protest from ruling party politicians was so great that the
government had to back down. Id.; see JapanMust Deliver Once US., EC Settle Row, Dunkel
Says, JAPAN EcON. NEWSWIRE, Nov. 18, 1992, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT
File (reporting that "Japan... bans rice imports on the grounds that it needs to maintain selfsufficiently in food supplies .. ");Japan Will Have To Make "PoliticalDecision" on Rice
Imports, Officials Say, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA), Dec. 3, 1992 (reporting that Japan would
have to make political decision based on rice imports). But see K. Blake Thatcher, Comment,
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Its Utility Against Alleged Unfair Trade Practicesby the
Japanese Government, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 492, 524. Thatcher noted, "United States successfully completed bilateral negotiations with Japan, in which Japan agreed to severely limit exports of subsidized rice to rest-of-world (ROW) markets. This agreement benefited United
States rice growers, increasing their ability to sell rice in ROW markets by reducing the supply
of subsidized rice." Id.
71. Tom Gorman, Sushi Maker Hooks New Distributor,L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1992, at B4.
Gorman wrote:
The Sushi Boy chain initially announced its desire to buy American Sushi because the cost
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port restrictions do not apply to processed foods.7 2 Eventually, the
sushi imports were permitted, but over the objection of the Ministry
of Agriculture. The Japanese government has resisted liberalizing
rice, even to a small degree, no doubt because farm groups are influential supporters of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. The arguments in favor of maintaining an import ban are familiar: (1) rice is a
basic staple of the Japanese diet, and Japan cannot be dependent upon
foreign supplies; and (2) immediate liberalization of the rice market
will disrupt Japan's carefully constructed rice production-adjustment
program.
In addition to import quotas, Japan stifles importation by imposing
stringent health, safety, and quality standards on many agricultural
products. Japan also imposes tariffs on farm products averaging
18%, the highest of any developed country.73 Japan protects other
commodities, such as silk, through the use of state trading authorities
with exclusive power to import the protected products. 74 The purpose of these import restrictions is to protect the integrity of domestic
farm programs; 50% of all farm production in Japan is covered by
price supports, resulting in food prices significantly above world
of both rice and fish is substantially cheaper in the United States. Earlier this month,
Japanese government officials formally approved the import of sushi--despite its ban on
foreign rice after conceding that sushi is a processed food as long as it contains no more
than 80% rice product.
Id.; see Sushi Boy Chain Drops Frozen Sushi Import Plan, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, Nov. 24,
1992, at I available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File (importing sushi permitted provided that raw fish on top of rice account for at least 20% of total weight of sushi).
72. Fusae Nara, Note, A Shift Toward Protectionism UnderSection 301 of the 1974 Trade
Act: Problems of UnilateralTrade Retaliation Under InternationalLaw, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV.
229, 251 (1990) (describing Japan's agreement to comply with GATT ruling in dispute over
processed-food products), Japan Agrees To Comply with GATT Ruling in Dispute over 11
ProcessedFood Products, 5 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1057-58 (Current Rep. 1988) (detailing
that Japan agreed to end its import quotas on processed foods, such as sushi, by April 1, 1990).
73. Hata Criticizes Dunkel's Proposal To Conclude GATT Talks, Kyodo News Service,
JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, Sept. 1, 1992, at 2 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT
File; see Japan Urged To Cut Tariffs on Processed Farm Products Kyodo News Service, JAPAN
ECON. NEWSWIRE, Dec. 12, 1992 at 1 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT FILE
(noting Washington's concern over Japan's high tariff on farm goods). Because of Japan's high
tariffs on farm goods, it "has been strongly opposed to tariffication, which would convert the
barriers to farm product imports into tariffs that would be gradually reduced, as proposed in
the Dunkel paper .. " Id.
74. See John H. Jackson, et al., Implementing the Tokyo Round: Legal Aspects of Changing InternationalEconomic Rules, 81 MicH. L. REV. 267, 318 (1982) (noting silk prices stabilization law was designed to protect only domestic producers of raw silk).
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levels.7 5 For example, the price of rice in Japan is five times the price
on world markets. These restrictions cause the average Japanese family to spend a greater portion of its income on food than a comparable
family in any other industrialized country.
B.

The European Community

The Treaty of Rome, which established the European Economic
Community in 1957, provides for a common market in agriculture
among member states in order to increase farm productivity, ensure a
fair standard of living for farmers, stabilize agricultural markets, assure the availability of supplies, and maintain reasonable prices for
consumers.7 6 For these purposes, the EC established the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP).77 The CAP is extremely complex, but it
establishes essentially a single market in agricultural policies through
a system of price supports, common financing, and coordinated administration of farm income-support programs. The CAP is administered by the authorities of the member states on a commodity-bycommodity basis. For most commodities, government intervention is
designed to maintain relatively high prices. For each commodity, the
EC Council of Agricultural Ministers annually sets a minimum price
that farmers should receive for their products. 78 To ensure that this

75. See Gregory C. Shaffer, Note, An Alternative to UnilateralImmigration Controls: To-

ward a CoordinatedU.S.-Mexico BinationalApproach, 41 STAN. L. REV. 187, 189 (1988) (contending that import restrictions enhance countries' competitiveness).
76. Jon G. Filipek, Agriculture in a World of Comparative Advantage: The Prospectsfor
Farm Trade Liberalization in the Uruguay Round of GA TT Negotiations, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J.

123, 132-33 (1989); Loretta F. Smith, Comment, The GATT and International Trade, 39
BUFF. L. REV. 919, 949 (1991). Smith stated, "The CAP has five goals: (1) to increase farm

productivity; (2) to ensure a fair standard of living for farmers; (3) to stabilize agricultural
markets; (4) to assure the availability of suppliers; and (5) to maintain reasonable prices for
consumers." Id.
77. See Wim Brussaard, ProtectingAgricultural Resources in Europe.- A Report from the
Netherlands, 24 IND. L. REV. 1525, 1533-34 (1991) (discussing agricultural resources protected by legislation and CAP of EC); Robert Housman & Durwood Zaelke, Trade, Environment, and Sustainable Development.- A Primer, 15 HASTINGS INT'L L. & COMP. L. REV. 535,

561 (1992) (noting that CAP grants subsidies to protect environmentally sensitive farmlands).
78. Jon G. Filipek, Agriculture in a World of ComparativeAdvantage: The Prospectfor
Farm Trade Liberalizationin the Uruguay Round of GA TT Negotiations, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J.

123, 140 (1989); Loretta F. Smith, Comment, The GA TT and International Trade, 39 BUFF. L.
REV. 919, 949 (1991). Smith explained that "[t]he CAP works this way: a common price for
the same farm product in all EC countries is achieved by the EC Council of Farm Ministers
setting each year a target price as well as an intervention price for all protected farm products." Id.
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price will be maintained, EC officials also set an intervention price. If
the free-market price for any commodity falls below the intervention
price in any part of the community, member-state authorities are required to purchase stocks to support the price.7 9 The funds to finance
these government interventions come from the EC budget. The financing of the CAP accounts for over 60% of the total EC budget.80
To prevent imports from disrupting the EC's price-support system,
the EC maintains a common external tariff. This tariff consists of a
variable levy equal to the difference between a present minimum import price, which is known as the threshold price, and the world-market price."1 The variable levy acts as a filter to ban low-priced farm
products that might compete with the high-priced domestic
commodities.
Under the CAP, huge commodity surpluses resulting from government authorities' intervention are sold on world markets through the
use of export subsidies. The EC also provides an export subsidy to
private firms that sell agricultural products on world markets. Because of the CAP, the EC has become a major food exporter.
The CAP's combination of domestic price supports and export subsidies has produced several EC budget crises and overproduction of
commodities, such as cereals, beef, butter, and milk. In 1991, the EC
Commission estimated that CAP costs would exceed the EC budget

79. Loretta F. Smith, Comment, The GA TT and International Trade, 39 BUFF. L. REV.
919, 949-50 (1991). Smith noted that "[i]f the price of non-EC food imports is lower than the
established target price, a variable levy is tacked onto the import's cost . . . [acting] like an
import quota .. " Id.; see Jon G. Filipek, Agriculture in a World of ComparativeAdvantage:
The Prospectsfor Farm Trade Liberalization in the Uruguay Round of GA TT Negotiations, 30
HARV. INT'L

L.J. 123, 133 (1989) (discussing non-EC food import prices lower than target

price).
80. BRIAN HILL, THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY: PAST, PRESENT AND FU84 (1984) (discussing CAP's effect upon EC budget); Allen Neely, Comment, British
Resistance to European Integration: An Historicaland Legal Analysis with an Examination of
the United Kingdom's Recent Entry into the European Monetary System, 10 DICK. J. INT'L L.
113, 125 (1991). This article states that "since CAP requires approximately three-quarters of
the community budget, CAP expenditures figure prominently in budget debates." Id.
81. B.T. Oleson, Linkage of AgriculturalPolicy and Long Term Prospectsin the International Grain Trade, 32 CAN. J. AGRIC. ECON. REV. 186, 198 (1985). Oleson explains, "In the
E.E.C. price-support system, the import levy is the difference between world market prices
expressed as prices C.I.F. Rotterdam and the threshold prices." Id.; see Alan Raul & Kevin
TURE

Brosch, Global Trade in Agricultural Products, in

INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AGREE-

at 229 (PLI Com. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 501, 1989) (explaining
tariff duty that is constantly adjusted).
MENTS,
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ceiling of approximately $39 billion. 82 As a result, the member states
initiated reforms to correct the imbalance between growing agricultural productivity and static demand. In May 1992, the EC Council
of Agricultural Ministers reached a compromise agreement, which requires the EC to cut price supports 29% for grains, 15% for beef, 5%
for butter, and similar amounts for several other commodities by
1997. 83 As a result, production levels and export subsidies will decrease. The EC will compensate individual producers for lost income
through direct payments equal to the difference between current and
reduced target prices. The compensatory payments are contingent
upon the producers setting aside at least 15% of their arable land.
These CAP reforms are a step in the right direction, but do not
represent a fundamental change in CAP policies. The system of price
supports remains intact; the variable-levy system remains in place;
and export subsidies continue to be used to dispose of surpluses.
The EC justifies its agricultural policies on social policy and environmental grounds. It also maintains that agricultural subsidies are
essential to prevent the depopulation of rural areas and to maintain a
minimum of social infrastructure. Many analysts believe that fundamental changes in the CAP will have catastrophic effects on farm incomes and will threaten the economic viability and environmental
quality of EC agricultural and world regions.
C.

The United States

The United States began to forge a national farm policy in the
1930s as a part of President Roosevelt's New Deal, which was
designed to bring the nation out of the Great Depression. The most
recent farm law, the Food and Agriculture Act of 1990, essentially
continues the programs established by the Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1933.84 Roosevelt's New Deal farm programs are, therefore,

82. See Allen Neely, Comment, British Resistance to European Integration: An Historical
and Legal Analysis with an Examination of the United Kingdom's Recent Entry into the European Monetary System, 10 DICK. J. INT'L L. 113, 125 (1991) (noting CAP costs have little
long-term benefits).
83. Alan Yonan, U.S. Receptive to Proposed Cut in EC Price Supports, UNITED PRESS
INT'L, May 22, 1992 (discussing various EC price-support cuts).
84. See Katherine E. Monahan, Note, U.S. Sugar Policy: Domestic and International
Repercussionsof Sour Law, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 325, 328-37 (1992) (discussing Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933); Matthew D. Roazen, Recent Decision, 65 TEMP. L.
REV. 1103, 1105 (1992) (explaining Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933).
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essentially still in place. The United States justifies its farm programs
using familiar reasoning: (1) while United States farms have a productive capacity that far exceeds domestic demand, farming is
marked by cycles of overproduction and low prices, followed by cycles of short supplies and higher prices; (2) individual farmers cannot
influence prices to any degree; and (3) agriculture is subject to unpredictable and uncontrollable forces, such as droughts, hail, freezes, and
floods.
It is the policy of the United States Congress to pass an Omnibus
Farm Bill every five years. Like the old Soviet Union, American agricultural authorities seem to like five-year plans. In similar fashion to
the programs in the EC and Japan, the heart of the American farm
program is a system of price supports for agricultural commodities."5
For each commodity subject to the program, the government sets a
"target price."86 The government also sets a "loan rate," which is
below the target price. 7 The purpose of the loan rate is to allow the
farmers to obtain credit from the Commodity Credit Corporation
(CCC) based on this lower crop price. At harvest, the farmer has a
choice either of (1) repaying the loan, or (2) defaulting and letting his
collateral, the crop, pass to the government. In addition, under the
American price supports, the government promises to remit a deficiency payment to farmers. This payment is calculated as the difference between the target price and the loan rate, or the difference
between the target price and the market price, whichever is smaller.88
Thus, the government guarantees farmers a minimum return per unit,
whether they are selling to the government or on the free market.
Obviously, this program costs a great deal of money: in 1991 federal appropriations for agriculture reached $52 billion, of which $30
billion was in the form of deficiency-payment subsidies8 9 In order to
85. See Michael Fix & George C. Eads, The Prospectsfor Regulatory Reform: The Legacy of Reagan's First Term, 2 YALE L.J. ON REG. 293, 296-97 n.20 (1985) (recognizing establishment of price supports for agricultural commodities by USDA).
86. B.J. Wynner III & Carol A. Bradley, Is the 1990 Farm Bill the Opening Shot in a
"Quiet Revolution?", 44 Sw. L.J. 1383, 1389 (1991).
87. See Christopher R. Kelley & Alan R. Malasky, Federal Farm Program PaymentLimitations Law: A Lawyer's Guide, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 199, 217 n.35 (1991) (providing example that target price for corn could be $3.03 per bushel and loan rate could be $1.82).
88. See id. (noting that, in example, difference between target price and market price for
bushel of corn would be $1.09 and this amount is deficiency payment).
89. See DepartmentofAgriculture Budget Briefing Briefers: Peter C. Meyers, Deputy Secretary of Agriculture, and Stephen Dewhurst, Director,Office of Budget and Program Analysis,
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put an overall limit on deficiency payments, the government specifies
each year the permitted acreage that may be planted in regulated
commodities. 90 Farmers receive deficiency payments according to individual calculations of their "base acreage" and "program yield" per
acre. l For many programs, there is also a payment ceiling per person.9 2 A wide variety of agricultural commodities benefit from support prices, including dairy products, wheat, wool, feed grains, cotton,
rice, peanuts, oilseeds, sugar, honey, and even mohair, the wool from
93
angora goats.
To compete with the EC, the United States also plays the game of
subsidizing wheat sales. Beginning in 1985, the United States Export
Enhancement Program (EEP) made generous subsidies available to
facilitate the sale of American wheat on world markets. Under EEP,
the Department of Agriculture pays cash bonuses to United States
exporters equal to the difference between United States domestic

prices and world prices.94 Under the 1990 Farm Act, if the Uruguay
Round Agreement was not signed by June 30, 1992, Congress must
increase export subsidies by $1 billion in 1994 and 1995. 9 - As a result, President Bush, on September 2, 1992, announced a new program to make thirty million tons of subsidized wheat available under
the EEP to twenty-eight countries.9 6 On October 1, 1992, the United

FED. NEWS SERV., Jan. 9, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File (noting
government outlays for agriculture).
90. See Christy Wise, STATES NEWS SERV., Mar. 5, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis

Library, CURRNT File (noting deficiency-payment limits).
91. See id. (discussing "base acreage" and "program yield" with deficiency payments).
92. See Mary Frings, Competition Gets Cotton Growers in a Tangle, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 27,
1985 at 14 (discussing payment ceilings).
93. See, e.g., Alan Raul & Kevin Brosch, Global Trade in AgriculturalProducts, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS, at 229 (PLI Com. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 501, 1989) (stating that price-support and income-assistance programs benefit
agricultural products like soybean oil); Katherine E. Monahan, Note, US. Sugar Policy: Domestic and InternationalRepercussions of Sour Law, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
325, 342 (1992) (discussing sugar benefit from support prices).
94. Agriculture: Australian Criticizes U.S. Wheat Plan but Says Main Focus Is on Uruguay Round, 9 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1666 (Current Rep. 1992).
95. See Government Subsidies Vital for US. Wheat Exports, REUTER LIB. REP., Sept. 2,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File (reporting that "[in the 1990 Farm
Act, Congress commanded the Agriculture Department to increase EEP subsidy by $1 billion
beginning in 1994 if a trade pact was not reached by June 30, 1992").
96. See Australian Minister Criticalof U.S. Wheat Subsidies, 9 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA)
1741 (Gen. Developments 1992) (contending that "President Bush announced September 2
that the United States would subsidize sales of 30 million tons of wheat to 28 countries between then and June 1993").
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States Department of Agriculture announced that $3.6 billion in export credit guarantees would be made available under the EEP in fiscal 1993.97
The United States' move caused dismay in many friendly countries,
including Australia, which announced it was filing a complaint with
the GATT concerning United States export subsidization. On September 9, the Australian Trade and Overseas Development Minister,
John Kerin, accused both the United States and the EC of "an escalation of anti-competitive behavior outside the GATT system." 9 He
warned that "an escalation of a subsidy war between the United
States and the European Community would put the whole global endeavor of the Uruguay Round at risk." 99 The timing of President
Bush's announcement, and the fact that, for the first time, the United
States was mounting a comprehensive subsidies program aimed at undermining free trade cast a pall over the GATT Uruguay Round
talks.
Besides the subsidies of the EEP, the United States also maintains
import quotas on various agricultural products including sugar, peanuts, cotton, dairy products, and even ice cream, under Section 22 of
the Agricultural Adjustment Act.
Two GATT Dispute-Settlement
Panels have addressed the issue of sugar-import quotas. These Panels
ruled that, although sugar is basically within the GATT waiver, the
provisions of the waiver cannot be used to justify current quotas that
restrict imported sugar to 1.25 million tons, about 8% of the 16.5
million tons consumed each year.10 The support price for sugar is
twenty-two cents per pound, about twice the world-market price.
97. See U.S. Decides To Subsidize Vegetable Oil Exports, XINHAU GEN. NEWS SERV.,
Oct. 15, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File (reviewing EEP that makes
exporters buy United States farm products at domestic prices and sell them at lower world
prices with USDA making up difference).
98. See Alan Riding, Warning from France on U.S. Wheat Subsidy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10,
199, at D2 (quoting John Kevin that there is "an escalation of anti-competitive behavior
outside the GATT system" by United States and EC).
99. See id. (finding that United States and EC put Uruguay Round plan at risk).
100. Dale Hathaway, The Global Food Regime in the 1990s: Efficiency, Stability and
Equity, I TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 393, 404 (1991) (recognizing United States'
"famous Section 22 waiver" which maintains quotas on dairy products, sugar, peanuts, cotton,
and other agricultural products).
101. See Katherine F. Monahan, Note, U.S. Sugar Policy: Domestic and International
Repercussions of Sour Law, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 325, 345-48 (1992) (discussing dual system of sugar control under both GATT and Section 22 of United States Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933).
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This program costs United States consumers about $3 billion per year
in higher grocery bills; and one family in Florida benefits particularly
from this program: it supplies 15% of United States cane sugar, reap0 2
ing $52-90 million per year from federal price supports.1
V. THE COSTS OF PROTECTIONISM
The present system of domestic farm policies in industrialized
countries causes major structural distortions in otherwise free-market
economies. These programs stimulate wasteful, surplus production,
which leads to structural imbalances in world and domestic markets.
Protecting agriculture on this scale is inefficient for several reasons.
Agricultural protectionism is costly to consumers. Consumers foot
the bill for the price supports and deficiency payments, as well as the
export subsidies. A 1988 Purdue University study estimated that the
American economy paid $107,000 in lost non-farm output for every
farm job saved by agricultural protectionism.10 3 For each protected
farm job, Americans suffered $14,000 in higher food costs."°4 According to this study, if the United States unilaterally liberalized farm
trade, annual income would rise by $14 billion. 5 The Organization
of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), based in Paris,
found that protecting agriculture causes an annual income loss in the
main industrial countries equal to the combined gross domestic products of Ireland and New Zealand. A 1990 OECD study concluded
that agricultural trade supports distort the allocation of resources and
act as an export tax on nonfood industries and services in member
102. See id. at 343-44 (stating, "High sugar prices have a disproportionate effect on low
income households"). Monahon explained that "[b]ecause so many food items contain sugar,
the sugar program is similar to a regressive sales tax, taking a higher percentage of smaller
incomes." Id.
103. The Trough, THE ECONOMIST NEWSPAPER, June 27, 1992, at 21. This article
stated:
[A] 1988 study from Purdue University looked at the real cost of America's farm subsidies. In 1987 dollars, it estimated, per farm job saved, the American economy paid
$107,000 in lost non-farm output, $80,000 in federal expenditures, and $14,000 in higher
food costs. Were the United States unilaterally to liberalize its farm trade, annual national income, by this estimate, would be $14 billion higher.
Id.
104. Id.
105. See id.; see also Katherine E. Monahan, Note, U.S. Sugar Policy.: Domestic and
InternationalRepercussions of Sour Law, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 325, 326-27
(1992) (noting that agricultural supports act as sales tax).
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countries.1"6 According to the OECD study, if all agricultural support policies were eliminated, household real income would increase
as much as 2.7% per year in New Zealand and as little as 0.3% in the
United States. Japan and the EC would gain 1.1% and 1.4%

respectively. 107
Current farm programs typically do not benefit the majority of

farmers. In the United States, government deficiency payments are
overwhelmingly targeted at large, relatively wealthy farm enterprises.
For example, according to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) there are approximately two million farms in the United
States.18 About 1.6 million of the smaller farmers, those with gross
sales between $1,000 and $40,000 per year, make less than $200 in

annual profits. 1°9 These families obviously farm part-time and do not
rely on farm revenues as their primary source of income. They receive little governmental support. About 286,000 farmers, on the
other hand, earn annual sales of $40,000 to $100,000. I 0 Their farms
are small, usually under 200 acres, and do not provide the household

its principal means of support. These farmers' average annual farm
income is $8,100, subsidies included, while their off-farm income is
$11,200.111

Only 363,000 farmers receive federal farm deficiency payments, the
106. See Agriculture: World Bank-OECD Study Cites Benefits of AgriculturalTrade Liberalization, 7 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 737 (Current Rep. 1990) (noting that study indicates
trade liberalization would increase world production of agricultural products, stabilize prices,
and shift production to developing countries).
107. See id. (contending that prices would stabilize, income would increase overall, and
countries would experience a $50 billion net annual economic gain).
108. See Neil D. Hamilton, The Study of Agricultural Law in the United States: Education, Organization and Practice, 43 ARK. L. REV. 503, 503 (1990) (noting that there are over
two million farms in United States); Stephen Yale Loehr, Foreign Farm Workers in the US.:
The Impact of the Immigration Reform and ControlAct of 1986, 15 N.Y.U. L. REV. & Soc.
CHANGE 333, 356 (1986) (discussing immigrant workers on "the nation's 2 million farms").
109. See America's Farm Subsidies, THE ECONOMIST, June 27, 1992, at 21 (stating that
"the smallest 'farmers,' those with gross sales between $1,000 and $4,000, make less than $200
in profits each year-if they do not actually lose money"); see also Sonja Hillgren, On the Farm
Front, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA), Oct. 11, 1985 (noting that "farm policies continue to
induce massive surpluses that drive down prices, hurting smaller farmers"); Nell Margolis,
Can You Find the Farmerin This Picture, INSIDER, Dec. 12, 1986, at 14 (discussing economic
squeeze on small farmers).
110. See America's Farm Subsidies, THE ECONOMIST, June 27, 1992, at 21 (stating that

"[e]ven for most of the 286,000 farms that had annual sales, during the 1980s, of $40,000$100,000, farming is not the household's principal activity").
111. See id. (finding that average annual income in "the 1980s was $8,100, subsidy included; off-farm income was $11,200").
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top echelon of producers." 2 Farm subsidization overwhelmingly
flows to these farmers on the high end of the income scale; the farm
enterprises receive 30% of all farm subsidies. Perhaps, it is no coincidence that there are 300,000 farmers in the United States who enjoy a
net worth of over $1 million. However, nearly one-half of all United
States farms, including those under the greatest financial stress, receive no payments at all. The following table shows graphically that
the distribution of government largesse is inversely related to the income of farmers.
Distribution of United States Government Commodity
Program Outlays by Sales Class
Percent
of all
farms

Percent
of total
crop &
livestock

Percent
of total
outlays

Percent
of farms
receiving

Average
outlay
per
recipient

2.1
5.1
14.6
18.4
59.8

31.3
20.0
26.7
14.3
7.7

14.7
22.0
38.1
19.8
5.4

56
62
66
57
18

$105,000
$ 58,000
$ 33,000
$ 15,000
$ 4,000

Sales Class
$500,000 and up
$250,000-499,999
$100,000-249,000
$40,000-99,999
Less than 40,000

Protecting agriculture is also inefficient because government farmsubsidy programs often encourage corruption and fraud. According
to the Wall Street Journal,a team of federal auditors concluded in
1990 that a family-farm operation in Arkansas, which controlled
35,000 acres of wheat and rice, had improperly collected $2.8 million
in federal subsidy payments, the largest recorded abuse of America's
farm-subsidy system." 3 This farming operation collected the improper payments by avoiding the current cap of $250,000 per year,
per farmer. The owner of the farm avoided the cap by dividing his
farm holdings into smaller pieces, each separately incorporated and
each directed by a different family member.
Current farm protectionist programs encourage a growing and
112. See id. (concluding that "the number of farmers who got federal farm handouts in
1986 was a mere 363,000").
113. Thomas M. Burton, Cash Crop: Many Farmers Harvest Government Subsidies in

Violation of Law, Wall St. J., N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1990, at Al. This article indicates that the
Conner family, which owned a "farming operation control[ing] 35,000 acres of wheat fields
and terraced rice land... in Jackson County, Arkansas.... improperly collected $2.8 million
in federal payments-[the] largest recorded abuse of America's farm subsidy program .
I.."
Id.
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wasteful bureaucracy: the 129,000 employees of the USDA maintain
offices in 94% of the nation's counties, although significant farming
occurs in only 16%. If the number of USDA bureaucrats is compared to the number of deficiency-payments recipients, one discovers
the astounding fact that it takes approximately one USDA employee
to dole out subsidies to three recipients. The number of USDA employees has been growing, despite a drastic drop in farm employment.
According to the USDA, the total number of people employed on
United States farms dropped from ten million in 1950 to just less than
three million in 1990.114 During the same period, the number of
USDA employees rose from 84,000 to 129,000.115 It is interesting

that if these two trends are extrapolated on a linear fashion, the day
will arrive about ten years from now, in the early part of the next
century, when there will actually be more USDA employees than
there are farmers.
This bureaucracy is wasteful, expensive, and cannot be justified in
the face of high United States budget deficits. Taxpayers shell out
several times to support farming. They pay the bill for the huge deficiency payments that add $400 annually to the food bill of the average
American family of four. They also pay taxes to support the enormous bureaucracy and to finance overly generous federal farm subsidies, most of which go to a handful of relatively wealthy farmers. In
1991 alone, federal appropriations for agriculture reached $52
billion.' 16
Perhaps the most pernicious impact of the industrialized countries'
domestic-farm programs is their effect on the Uruguay Round of
Trade Negotiations. The Uruguay Round, which commenced in
1986, comprises fifteen negotiating groups, encompassing a wide
range of trade issues: intellectual property, safeguards, textiles, services, tropical products, the functioning of the GATT system, dispute
settlement, tariffs, trade-related investment measures, non-tariff measures, multinational trade agreements and arrangements, subsidies and
114. See Douglas E. Kneeland, Urbanization of Rural U.S. Called Peril to Farmland,
N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1981, at B8, (noting employment drop from 10 million to 2.9 million).
115. See Critics Say Rivalries Hurt Work of Food Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1981, at
D4 (discussing number of USDA employees).
116. Richard Orr, Consumers Could See Price Breaks on Food, CHIC. TRIB., Aug. 19,
1991 at 3. The net farm income is the value of production, plus government subsidy payments,
minus all costs in a calendar year. Id. Orr reports, "For 1991, the department forecasts net
cash income at $52 billion to $57 billion ..
" Id.
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countervailing duties, GATT articles, and natural resource-based
products, in addition to agriculture. The negotiating countries
reached agreement on virtually all of these issues, but agreement
stalled in regard to agriculture. Yet, the nature of the negotiation
dictated that the completed agreements were "on hold" until the agriculture talks were resolved. The terms of the Uruguay Round dictated that there must be an agreement on all issues or there would be
no agreement at all. Thus, the farm-trade impasse held hostage a
wide range of agreements. When the agriculture negotiations broke
down in 1990, many feared that other agreements of the Round protecting intellectual property rights and liberalizing non-agricultural
trade would be jeopardized. The successful completion of the Uruguay Round could pump approximately $5 trillion into the world
economy over the next 10 years, approximately $1 trillion into the
American economy, and additional cumulative income of $17,000 for
the average American family of four.
The agricultural trade mess has also severely impacted trade relations between industrialized countries and developing countries. The
rival subsidy programs of the United States and the EC have caused a
transatlantic trade war. As each attempts to out-subsidize the other,
both have dumped farm products onto world markets. This trade war
is an unmitigated disaster, both for the participants and for the
friendly agricultural exporting countries caught in the middle, such as
Australia, Canada, and Argentina.
One might think that this trade war constitutes a boon for developing countries because the primary focus of export-subsidy competition
is to sell cheap food to developing-country markets. Although developing countries experience a short-term benefit, in the medium and
long terms, the impact is particularly pernicious. Many developing
countries are rural in character and depend on agricultural production to maintain income and employment levels. The farm protectionism of the developed world discourages developing countries from
exporting agricultural products, reduces developing countries' earnings, and slows down or stunts their economic development. This situation is counterproductive to the developed countries as well. If
developing countries were allowed to build the agricultural sectors of
their economies, they might experience the economic growth necessary to become customers for developed countries' exports.
Subsidized exports by developed countries also lower the international market price for commodities, thus eliminating potential buyers
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of the developing counties' more expensive exports. These artificially
low world-market prices depress domestic agricultural prices in developing countries, reduce domestic farm incomes, and lessen the incentive to plant food crops. Thus, international agricultural trade must
be reformed to stimulate industrial development in developing countries. This would also facilitate the creation of agricultural processing
industries, an initial level of industrial development, which could begin the process of alleviating world poverty.
VI.

CONCLUSION

First, it is imperative to cut a deal at the GATT Uruguay Round
negotiations. The world economy is in the doldrums. No other single
event would have more impact than would a Uruguay Round agreement. Not only will the current atmosphere of trade friction among
the EC, Japan, and the United States be alleviated, but a whole variety of positive actions will stimulate the world economy, including:
protection of intellectual property rights; new frameworks for trade in
services, investment flows, and textiles; and a strengthening of the
GATT multilateral trading system. A GATT agreement is also important because it would indicate that the major trading nations can
compromise on agricultural trade, despite a dismal record in past negotiating rounds.
What should be the elements of an agricultural trade compromise
at the Uruguay Round?
(1) The United States should voluntarily agree to relinquish its
GATT waiver, which allows the United States to impose quotas
on agricultural imports.
(2) Japan should agree progressively to open its market to rice
and other commodities.
(3) The EC should reform its variable-levy system, which acts as
a quota.
(4) All import restrictions on agricultural products, such as
quantitative restrictions, variable levies, minimum-import prices,
mixing regulations, state trading, and voluntary-restraint agreements should be converted into fixed tariffs. The EC's variablelevy system could be converted into a tariff by placing an upper
limit on variable levies. To satisfy the EC, this "tariffication"
could be combined with some "rebalancing," that is, an increase
in tariffs on certain products with GATT-bound zero levies, such
as oilseeds and corn gluten.
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(5) The member nations should limit the use of subsidies by (a)
instituting a subsidies freeze, (b) classifying subsidy programs according to their effect on trade, and (c) banning those subsidies
that have a direct effect on trade, such as export subsidies.
It is not enough, however, to reform international agricultural
trade without recognizing the equally deleterious effect of inefficient
and expensive domestic farm policies. The major industrialized countries-the United States, the EC, and Japan-are all experiencing the
same problems with respect to their domestic farm policies: budget
imbalances, overproduction of stocks, and trade dislocation.
Although diversity should be allowed in national agricultural programs, a framework for reform should be adopted to include:
(1) progressively lower price supports-target prices and loan
prices;
(2) "decoupled" payments to farmers to replace lower deficiency
payments-the decoupled payments would be structured to
reach middle class "family" farmers, and
(3) a Rural Conservation Reserve program to preserve the environment and biodiversity.
These reforms would allow a gradual transition to market-oriented
farming in both the international and domestic arenas. The global
community should reject both the present system of massive and expensive government intervention and the siren song of managed agricultural trade.
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